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E ver since the end of the "golden age", unemployment has been the most serious and socially least acceptable vice of highly developed capitalist economies. Moreover, ever since that time economists have been asked and expected to provide solutions to cure that vice -a very legitimate demand particularly since a discipline is addressed that often claims to have unveiled the laws of economic interaction as much as natural science has discovered natural laws. In mainstream (Walrasian) economics, 1 the story is rather simple: unemployment must be rooted in the malfunctioning of the labour market. Either the actors directly involved -employers and their organisations or employees and their unions -or the actor providing the legal and institutional framework -i.e. the government or state actor regulating labour markets or providing a social cushion that infl uences the decisions of the actors that are directly involved -must in some way or the other be blamed for not allowing market forces to do their job. And the bulk of theory providing ever more rationale for disrupting the allocative process of labour markets has become unintelligible: effi ciency wage theories, monopolistic union theories, public choice theories and, last but not least, NAIRU theories of different origins fi ll bookshelves to overfl owing.
Common to all such approaches is a microeconomic perspective which is supposed to provide an answer to the question why it may be rational for economic agents not to allow market forces to clear the labour market at the equilibrium real wage level. This kind of research stance can be understood as a reaction to standard Keynesian reasoning of the Hicks-Hansen type, which apparently relied completely on ad hoc rigidities (price and wage stickiness) and seemed to be irreconcilable with the stagfl ation period of the late 1970s and which, furthermore, was too hydraulic not to be puzzled as to why governments found it so diffi cult to restore full employment. In Germany, for instance, the Keynesian "Growth and Stability Act" of 1967 was recognised as helping to overcome the 1966/67 business cycle downturn, but seemed incapable of dealing with the following recessions of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Under these circumstances, the Keynesian focus on explaining unemployment as a systematic product of uncoordinated market behaviour -not as a temporary failure of markets to behave appropriately -has been almost completely lost: unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon. New Keynesian and post-Keynesian authors from different backgrounds have emphasised the importance of effective demand (constraints) in determining the overall volume of employment (and, hence, unemployment) independent of labour market failures. 2 It is this New Keynesian or post-Keynesian basis 3 on which the following analysis is built. Firstly, a market 1 For a reference as to what is meant by "mainstream economics" see e.g. S. K e e n : Debunking Economics, The naked emperor of the social sciences, London/ New York 2001, here p. 10. Carlin and Soskice refer to the "neoclassical benchmark model": cf. W. C a r l i n , D. 3 Some important features are: (1) macroeconomic modelling; (2) importance of fundamental uncertainty as opposed to stochastic risks;
(3) importance of money as the institution linking present decisions and an uncertain future; (4) a hierarchy of markets running from the fi nancial markets to commodity and labour markets; cf. also M. L a v o i e : Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis, Aldershot 1992.
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* Professor, Department of Economics and Politics, University of Hamburg. The author gratefully acknowledges the fi nancial support of the Hans Böckler foundation. This paper is part of a larger project on "Employment systems in international comparison". The author's thanks also go to Andrew Watt, Hansjörg Herr and Carol Hogg for fruitful comments. However, the usual caveats apply. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-006-0195-2 participation theory of economic policy will be outlined in very broad strokes and a cooperative approach to macroeconomic policymaking portrayed. This will be needed to determine in what way macroeconomic demand management can be used to manipulate "market constellations" in a systematic, though not hydraulic, way. In a further step, we shall inquire as to how far macroeconomic governance can be used to explain the different growth and employment performances of selected EU countries, or to put it differently: are there differences in the abilities of nations to create favourable "market constellations"?
The Creation of Favourable "Market Constellations"
Once the idea of a general equilibrium as the natural long-term position of any economy is replaced by the notion of multiple equilibria, unemployment becomes a systematic characteristic of decentralised market economies as opposed to merely being a "market failure". Therefore, economic policy towards establishing full employment is not solely a functional device of "market repair" but must be established by a political will (normative target) and can only be pursued by way of participating in the market process. Therefore, the political actor(s) is not a subject external to the market participants (objects) but a market participant (object) himself who is constrained by market forces just like any other market participant. 4 Governmental (and other corporatist actors') interventions will have measurable impacts on quantities and prices, but as any other market participant, the political (or corporatist) actor has fi nally to accept the market outcome, i.e. cannot ex ante discriminate between warranted quantity and unwarranted price effects. 5 However, there are means to reduce the magnitude of this contingency (or lack of sharpness in policy control) by way of introducing (codifi ed) rules and regulations or setting up or stimulating institutions that reduce the available number of options for market participants and, therefore, decrease the uncertainty about future actions. Obviously, there is a trade-off between transaction costs (due to the need to adapt to changing market situations) and uncertainty costs -which leaves the optimal mix of "laissez-faire" and "regulation" open to experience. 4 The idea of a "market participation theory of economic policy" as opposed to the traditional "market failure theory of economic policy" has been most forcefully put forward by the German post- Yet, uncertainty-reducing institutions and regulations are much easier to justify in a New Keynesian or post-Keynesian framework than in the neoclassical theory of "market failure" 6 and can help in creating a "market constellation" which is favourable to growth and employment.
Some of these uncertainty-reducing institutions -with particular respect to our purpose -are collective bargaining systems, the institutional settings of central banks and institutional structures to coordinate different independent but interdependent political actors in order to establish an optimal policy mix. Collective bargaining systems provide the necessary "nominal anchor" in modern non-precious metal (fi at money) currency systems; the central bank design is important for securing the scarcity of paper money. Both institutional set-ups reduce the otherwise precarious volatility of (nominal) wages and prices: it has become common sense that there is a strong correlation between the degree of independence of central banks and the infl ation performance of an economy on the one hand, and a likewise strong correlation between infl ation performance and infl ation volatility. There is less agreement about the infl uence of collective bargaining systems on wage settlements and infl ation developments. A very infl uential study by Calmfors and Driffi ll 7 proposes a "hump-shaped" link while other evidence 8 argues in favour of a negative correlation: the more decentralised the collective bargaining system, the higher wage settlements and infl ation rates will be. 9 Be that as it may, there is no doubt that collective bargaining institutions and the central banking design may impinge in a systematic way on the degree of uncertainty about infl ation developments and the valuation of assets.
Only recently, the mutual causality (Wechselwirkung in a Kantian sense 10 ) of collective bargaining systems and central banking designs has been studied in depth and some "conventional wisdom" about the (long-term) neutrality of monetary policy and the "free lunch" assumption of central bank independence has been shaken. 11 Moreover, it has been asked whether it is sensible to delegate half of demand management to an autonomous body such as the central bank 12 -indicating a possible coordination problem between fi scal and monetary policies. 13 Both lines of discussion can be joined by realising that all the actors involved -the political actor, the central bank and the social partners -pursue individual utility maximisation under the constraint of the Phillips curve trade-off, 14 but may (and most certainly will) have different preferences with respect to infl ation and unemployment. In a moment, we shall see how this can end up in a policy game which not only leaves the actors involved dissatisfi ed but also produces a sub-optimal result in terms of overall welfare. Therefore, institutions that produce incentives for the actors involved -i.e. the political actor responsible for fi scal policy, the central bank responsible for monetary policy and the social partners responsible for wage policy -to cooperate may be able to create market constellations -i.e. a macro-economic environment -favourable to growth and employment.
The Nordhaus Model
As a three actors game is too complex to be exposed, it will be split into two separate games in which the central bank is the connecting piece. This seems appropriate as it is the central bank's monetary policy which is the mutual focus of both wage policy and fi scal policy alike, but there is no direct interaction between the latter two. Let us start with the interaction 11 Cf. e.g. R. J. F r a n z e s e , P. of monetary and fi scal policy as portrayed in the Nordhaus model. 15 We assume that: the utility functions of both actors include the variables "unemployment" and "infl ation"; both actors show different preferences with respect to unemployment and infl ation (the central bank is more averse to infl ation than the political actor); there is a (short and long-term) Phillips curve tradeoff between unemployment and infl ation; both actors target a (different) volume of aggregate demand in order achieve the preferred combination of unemployment and infl ation; the political actor additionally puts emphasis on the budgetary balance as it provides the means to offer public goods to the electorate (necessary to secure re-election).
In Figure 1 , the M and F curves portray the level of aggregate demand which the central bank (M) and the political actor (F) target respectively. They can do so by choosing a policy mix of monetary and fi scal policy, here approximated by the instrument variables i (real interest rate) and S (budgetary balance): the same aggregate demand can be achieved through a more expansionary monetary policy and tighter fi scal policy (i.e. lower i and higher, or more positive, S) or, alternatively, through a more restrictive monetary policy in combination with a more expansionary fi scal policy (i.e. higher i and lower, or more negative, S).
The difference between the M and F curves refl ects the autonomous relevance that fi scal policy (budgetary balance S) has for the political actor. Points A and B represent the "optimal" combinations of fi scal and 16 as the central bank is more averse to infl ation than the political actor, it favours point B at tighter monetary policy and the political actor favours point A at more expansionary monetary policy and higher budget defi cits (as an expression of the desire to have more room to manoeuvre). Obviously, points A and B cannot both be realised at the same time: either there is some kind of coordination between fi scal and monetary policy and some point C on the contract curve will eventually be reached 17 or, in the case of confl ict (or non-cooperation), we will end up at point D -which is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium -or at point E, which is a Stackelberg equilibrium. Whether the cooperative point C will be preferred as compared to the non-cooperative points D and E depends on the preference structure of both actors: the more averse to infl ation the central bank and the more averse to unemployment the political actor, the less likely it will be that the cooperative point C will be preferred. 18 Or to put it differently, if both actors do not care only for one of the two policy goals of "low infl ation" and "high employment", a cooperative effort will be able to establish a policy mix which both actors prefer to the non-cooperative solutions of the Stackelberg or Nash equilibria. 19 However, such a preferred policy mix will only be achieved if the famous cooperation trap of the "prisoner's dilemma" can be overcome.
Role of the Social Partners
Here we are not concerned with the (institutional) incentives necessary to increase the likelihood of cooperation 20 but shall pose the question whether the underlying confl ict can be mitigated by bringing the social partners into the picture. Indeed, this would be the case if the social partners were able to prevent infl ationary developments (to which the central bank is more averse than the political actor) from accompanying increasing employment (which the political actor favours more than the central bank) -i.e. if they were able to suppress the Phillips curve logic. As the Phillips curve is based on the "original Phillips curve" linking 16 For a derivation of the points A, B, C, and D based on preferences, cf. W. D. N o r d h a u s , ibid. 17 Where exactly on the contract curve such a cooperative point C will come to lie depends on the bargaining position of both actors. This position is determined by the preference structure of the actors. 18 A. H e i s e : New Politics. Integrative Wirtschaftspolitik für das 21. Jahrhundert, Münster 2001. 19 The willingness to cooperate can, therefore, be interpreted as a litmus test of whether they really pursue not only a single target policy. Autonomous central banks (and the Bundesbank in particular) have often been accused of pursuing only price stability and neglecting employment and growth completely. inversely nominal wage increases to falling unemployment, the social partners may well have a stake in the game. From a large number of studies 21 we know that the potential to control the Phillips curve logic depends on the ability of the social partners to create external effects (i.e. nominal wage claims in excess of the distributional margin given by labour productivity growth and the tolerated infl ation rate) and the willingness to internalise such external effects: decentralised collective bargaining systems (acting at company level) are said neither to expose a willingness to internalise external effects nor to have the ability to create such external effects (Calmfors-Driffi ll case). Centralised collective bargaining systems, 22 in which the social partners (and, most importantly, the trade unions) act as "encompassing organisations", do have the ability to create external effects but will also be willing to internalise them. They will do so once they have realised that any nominal wage increase will (ceteris paribus) be completely passed on to prices and leave real wages unaltered. Intermediate collective bargaining systems (acting at regional or sectoral level), however, have the ability to create external effects, yet they are not willing to internalise them as the effect of the nominal wage increases on the overall price level will be a restricted one (for the restricted scope -regional or sectoral -of their bargaining power) and, hence, enable them to alter their (sectoral or regional) real wage rate. 23 This may also be the case with respect to decentralised collective bargaining systems if we allow for the signalling effects of key companies and "local pushfulness", i.e. strong and myopic trade unions at company level (Soskice case). 22 Centralisation means that the collusion of heterogeneous interests into credible commitments is possible; i.e. decentralised but highly cooperative trade unions and employers' organisations may be de jure decentralised but act de facto as a centralised collective bargaining system in the above sense. the social partners in this argument) are targeting 24 with respect to the level of employment. LF is the labour force which is, for the sake of simplicity, taken as given. w r p is the real wage rate which the employers are willing to accept (which is given by labour productivity growth and a mark-up accounting for imperfect competition on commodity markets). In the case of a centralised bargaining system, for a considerable margin trade unions are willing and able to suppress the "Phillips curve logic" -from a level of employment L N 1 onwards, they will not ask for higher (targeted) real wages but increase the utility of the labour force (as their political aim) by increasing employment. Above employment level L N 2 , which can be interpreted as the point at which the number of unemployed equals the number of vacancies, real wages will start to increase either through higher collective claims or by way of wage drift. Below employment level L N 1 , pressure on trade unions will force them to accept lower (targeted) real wage increases than employers would be willing to pay at full employment levels. 25 Whether a fi scal and monetary policy mix will be able to establish employment level L N 1 or L N 2 depends on implicit or explicit coordination mechanisms.
If an institution -a concerted action or macro-dialogue -empowers the actors involved to commit themselves credibly to pre-established policy rules, the central bank may be willing and forced to allow for a level of aggregate demand which refl ects the preferences of the political actor and the social partners -L N 2 in this case. This may be called "ex ante" coordination. 24 "Targeting real wages" means that trade unions bargain nominal wages under the expectation of price infl ation. The assumption is that their expectations are met, i.e. no revision of plans is necessary. 25 The exact position of L N 1 depends on the strength of the collective bargaining institutions to suppress the Phillips curve logic in both ways, i.e. to balance externalisation and internalisation.
• If the central bank pursues a monetary policy of "testing the waters" 26 and the political actor and the social partners can bring themselves not to exploit the central bank's pragmatism, L N 2 may also be reached -this may be termed the "Fed strategy" for it has allegedly been the policy stance of the US Federal Reserve Board during the 1990s. 27 Almost the same scenario would be imaginable if the political actor were to take the more active (fi scal) policy stance, and the central bank were not to react in a restrictive manner but allow for aggregate demand to increase (i.e. any point on the contract curve in Figure 1 ). 28 Both cases may be called "ex post" or implicit coordination. However, they seem to be very fragile and rather coincidental forms of cooperation. 29 as the incentives for the actors involved not to defect (i.e. not to exploit) are not very strong -that at least is what game theory teaches us.
If cooperation cannot be established, the central bank will enforce its level of aggregate demand (at Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium) preventing employment from rising above L N 1 -this may be termed "monopolistic coordination" 30 or the "Bundesbank strategy" for it has allegedly been the policy stance of the German Bundesbank ever since it pursued an independent monetary policy. 31 If the central bank were to accommodate any wage and fi scal policy stance, 32 again L N 2 would be within 26 reach, yet at a comparably high infl ation rate (the exact amount of which depends on the infl ation aversion of the social partners). 33 As is summarised in Table 1 , the market constellations look quite different if we focus on decentralised, non-coordinated (company or industry level) collective bargaining systems.
If the central bank accommodates whichever wage claims and fi scal policy stances arise, the infl ation rate will certainly be very high and possibly accelerating. As high infl ation rates are typically associated with high infl ation volatility, liquidity preference considerations of wealth owners will curtail investment spending, economic growth and employment -hence, employment will be below L N 2 , but probably above the level which a non-accommodating central bank under "Bundesbank strategy" would enforce; 34 for instance at level L N 4 . An (explicitly) cooperative constellation including a non-accommodating central bank and non-coordinated social partners is hard to imagine as the number of actors (particularly on the side of the social partners) is too numerous for a strategic and credible commitment.
In the case of a non-accommodating central bank, the result will be high unemployment (L N 3 ) in combi-33 V. G u z z o , A. Ve l a s c o : The case for a populist Central Banker; in: European Economic Review, Vol. 43, 1999, pp. 1317-1344; R. J. F r a n z e s e , P. H a l l , op. cit. 34 It must be admitted that this is a very risky statement -above all based on empirical observations (cf. R. J. F r a n z e s e , P. H a l l , op. cit. here p. 195). Whether an accommodating central bank is able to provide market constellations that are more favourable to growth and employment than the market constellations provided by a nonaccommodating central bank under the "Bundesbank strategy" may well depend on the extent of "local pushfulness" of decentralised social partners and the degree of uncertainty about whether this scenario may turn into accelerating infl ation. • • • nation with low infl ation whatever the central bank strategy is. This is at least true as long as we assume an intermediate bargaining level (industry or region) or "local pushfulness" at company level (i.e. the Soskice case).
Only under the condition of "marginalised", decentralised social partners (i.e. the Calmfors-Driffi ll case) and a "Fed strategy", may employment rise to levels between L N 4 and L N 2 -the exact position of the w r b curve (in Figure 2 ) depends on the extent of "marginalisation". 35 Nevertheless, this is likely to be an unstable constellation once disinfl ationary developments turn into a defl ationary process due to the lack of a nominal anchor. 36 Table 1 captures possible outcomes for employment and infl ation under different market constellations which depend on collective bargaining systems, central banking designs and explicit or implicit mechanisms of coordination between the key macroeconomic policy fi elds. Assuming that the individual members of a society receive positive utility from low infl ation and high employment (or, rather, low unemployment), it becomes clear that a non-accommodative monetary policy, either under the "Fed strategy" or in cooperative orientation, coupled with a centralised collective bargaining system, provides the best and preferred market constellations. However, these results merely show that macropolitics matter as much as the insti- 35 "Marginalisation" would be complete -and thus, the w r b curve would cut the w r p curve at point L N 2 -if the actors on the labour market were pure "price takers". 36 It needs to be remembered that there may be an equilibrium real wage rate at w r b = w r p but defi nitely no equilibrium nominal wage rate. Yet, the ghost of defl ation can possibly be banned if demand management can be used effi ciently to control employment levels and/or if downward barriers to nominal wage drops -such as effective minimum wages -are introduced. 37 But it should not be forgotten that these results are "normative" in the sense that they solely mark out the ability of the political actors to govern. In no way do they positively prove to what extent actual governments and corporative actors use their room for manoeuvre. In the following, we shall explore empirically the extent to which differences in macroeconomic performance can be explained by different macropolitical governance.
•
Table 1 Unemployment and Infl ation in Various Market Constellations
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Mix
Macroeconomic Governance and Economic Performance
As the focus of our investigation will be on monetary, fi scal and wage policy under particular external conditions, and as we have established that the institutional embeddedness of macroeconomic governance is crucial for the understanding of the room for manoeuvre and the creation of market constellations, a multi-country cross-comparison does not seem an appropriate method to capture the differences in performance, as the implicit non-linearity of instrumental relations will be better recorded by a narrative approach. 38 Moreover, it seems more appropriate to focus on a few countries only rather than on country clusters ("models" or "regimes") as has become common in modern social science 39 since different macroeconomic market constellations may well cut across different "models". The selection of such countries follows the comparativistic research designs 40 "most 37 U. F r i t s c h e et al.: Wirtschaftliche Regime westlicher Industrienationen. Unterschiede, Wachstumsperspektiven und wirtschaftspolitische Optionen in ausgewählten Ländern, Abschlussbericht eines Forschungsprojektes der Hans Böckler Stiftung, Berlin 2005, also name the "external economic scenario" as a cornerstone of a particular market constellation. Although exchange-rate developments may clearly impinge on the growth and employment performance of a country (as we shall see later) and may also cause monetary and wage policy reactions, I have so far not explicitly included the "external economic scenario" into my investigation for one reason: for the longest time in the period under investigation, the exchange rates among EMS countries had no instrument status as they were fi xed among each other. However, real exchange rates, being infl uenced by the wage policy of the social partners, may well be a strategic variable particularly in small, open economies in fi xed currency systems. 38 For an introduction to the "narrative approach" in comparative eco- . As compared to highly sophisticated econometric analysis, which may be an important tool in "data-mining", the narrative approach is better able to study complex interactions in detail, to identify critical junctures and non-linearities (as may be expected in our case). similar with different outcome" and "most different with similar outcome". As can be seen from Figure 3 , Germany, the Netherlands and Austria show rather different labour market outcomes in terms of the level and development of unemployment, yet they are ordinarily clustered as "coordinated market economies" 41 showing very similar labour market (allocational system) and welfare state institutions (distributional system). While Austria experienced an above-average employment trend over the whole period under investigation (with only a slight divergence since the beginning of the last decade), Germany's trend was much closer to the EU-15 average for the fi rst three decades and has sharply moved below average (i.e. showing higher unemployment) since the beginning of the last decade. The Netherlands, moreover, produces a very average result during the fi rst two decades under investigation only to move sharply above average during the 1990s and to keep that position ever since. 42 And the United Kingdom reveals a quite similar outcome to the Netherlands despite considerable differences in labour 41 The distinction "coordinated market economies" and "liberal market 42 Apparently, the EMU countries Germany, the Netherlands and Austria have all done worse (to differing degrees) than the non-EMU country UK -one is tempted to establish a link to the budgetary policy rule of "zero defi cits" enshrined in the European Stability and Growth Pact. As experience is still too short, this cannot be tested here but clearly shows that the institutional settings marking a relevant market constellation must be expanded in future research to budgetary policy designs (such as the "golden rule" versus "zero-defi cit rules"). With respect to infl ation (cf. Figure 4) , the three continental EU members (as "coordinated market economies") show a very similar development: during the 1970s and 1980s, price stability was clearly higher than the EU average -yet the Netherlands improved its record during the 1980s after having fi xed the Dutch gilder to the deutschmark and the legendary "Wassenaar accord" in 1982. During the 1990s and the fi rst half of the following decade, a marked trend towards price stability convergence can be detected -partly a worldwide phenomenon of growing importance attached to price stability, partly a European phenomenon on the "Maastricht road" to European Monetary Union. The UK (as a "liberal market economy") differs with respect to the early decades under investigation but has joined the "price-stability gang" since the 1990s.
In the following, two questions will be posed.
Are the comparative unemployment and infl ation developments (compared to the EU-15 average) explicable in terms of different market constellations created by distinguishable macropolitical governance?
Do these results positivistically match the normatively derived hypothesis summarised in Table 1? It must be remembered that a possible mismatch does not necessarily reject the underlying theoretical frame but may indicate that political and corporatist • • actors may refuse to use their room for manoeuvre. In any case, a mismatch would demand further investigation.
Let us start by putting the selected countries into the frame of probable market constellations provided by Table 1 . Before we can do so, we have to qualify the monetary policy stance of each country as to whether it must be judged to be "non-accommodative" or "accommodative", and if it is non-accommodative, whether it follows the asymmetric "Bundesbank strategy" or the symmetric "Fed or cooperative strategy". Additionally, we shall have to qualify the collective bargaining systems with respect to their degree of corporatism 43 and "marginalisation". 44 Numerous studies 45 have provided different indices to measure monetary policy orientations. Although the focus of each study differs with respect to the legal, institutional or functional independence of central banks, they all claim to measure the "conservativeness" of central bankers concerning the priority given to price stability against alternative targets (e.g. employment and growth). Or to put it differently, the more conservative a central bank, the more non-accommodative its policy orientation. However, there is a major problem with all these indices: they do not take into account that legally, institutionally or functionally dependent central banks may, nevertheless, pursue a non-accommodative policy by pegging the exchange-rate of their currency irrevocably to some other currency. 46 However, this is very important in the case of our country sample, where the Netherlands and Austria completely pegged their currencies to the deutschmark, leaving no room whatsoever for discretion. The Austrian Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OENB) handed monetary policy over to the Deutsche Bundesbank in 1976, the Dutch central bank -De Nederlandsche Bank (NLB) -followed in 1984, implying that their respective monetary policy stance can henceforth only be judged as "nonaccommodative/Bundesbank strategy". Even prior to 1976, the OENB was seen as fairly independent (non-accommodative) while prior to 1984 the NLB was defi nitely more accommodative than the Bundesbank 43 "Corporatism" or, synonymously, "coordination", means the de facto ability to behave as "encompassing organisation" as compared to the de jure degree of centralisation of a bargaining system. 44 Cf. footnote 39. (resulting in a continuous fall of the Dutch gilder relative to the deutschmark). After pegging their currencies to the deutschmark, the "macroeconomic policy game" changed in the Netherlands and Austria: neither fi scal nor wage policy had to take monetary policy actions into account when fi xing their policy stance. While wage policy in both countries was embedded in an institutional framework 47 in order to secure (international) competition-led wage settlements, fi scal policy was free to target employment or alternative goals (e.g. fi scal consolidation). The British Bank of England (BoE) was only granted (instrumental) independence in 1998 by the New Labour government under Tony Blair. Until then, it was a subordinated part of the Treasury, which was commonly translated into a (very) accommodative monetary policy stance. However, monetary restriction as part of the monetarist macroeconomics favoured by Margret Thatcher's governments since 1979 can hardly be described as "accommodative". Yet, as monetary and fi scal policies were still combined in the hand of a unitary actor (the Treasury), no non-cooperative strategic policy game was to be feared and a strategic policy-targeting (breaking infl ation expectations in the 1980s, stabilising aggregate demand and employment in the 1990s 48 ) was still possible.
It seems easier to place the selected countries in the "coordinated-non-coordinated" range of collective bargaining systems. Although many studies 49 claim Germany and the Netherlands legally to have intermediately centralised bargaining systems (with a dominant industry bargaining level), the high coverage rate (80-90%) and cooperative organisational structures within the employers' and employees' organisations allow us to group them alongside Austria as "coordinated collective bargaining systems", while the UK must be regarded as "uncoordinated" (with dominant company bargaining level). Moreover, there are signs that the "local pushfulness potential" of company-level actors has suffered during the reforms of the Thatcher 47 In the Netherlands, the tripartite "Socio-Economic Council" and the bipartite "Stichting van de Arbeid" must be mentioned, in Austria it is the tripartite "Economic and Social Council". At this point, we will simply ignore the specifi c institutional designs and incentive systems. administration 50 and we have come a long way down from the "Soskice case" towards the "Calmfors-Driffi ll case".
Taking into account that the fi gures in Table 2 show averages over periods of different length and start from different levels, 51 there seems to be no obvious mismatch between the hypothetical levels of infl ation and unemployment in different market constellations and the empirical picture of the selected countries: the continental economies of Germany, Austria and the Netherlands combining a non-accommodative Bundesbank strategy with highly coordinated collective bargaining systems have done considerably better in both infl ation and employment performance 52 than the UK and its non-coordinated bargaining system in the realm of monetarist non-accommodative monetary orientation since the 1980s. Yet, the UK has seemingly gained from its move to a more Fed-like central bank design since the early 1990s and changes in wage-setting behaviour in line with the Calmfors-Driffi ll case. 53 However, presupposing the developments portrayed in Figures 3 and 4 , it remains to be clarifi ed why the Netherlands did not do better, particularly with respect to unemployment, during the period until 1984, and why Germany has been doing so badly in recent times 54 -both of which are not quite explained by the predetermined market constellations.
Conclusion
This paper has only made a start to explaining and assessing economic policymaking in the analytical framework of market participation and the creation of market constellations. It has been argued that a set of institutional, cultural and political factors form peculiar market constellations if they show some persistence. These market constellations may, on the one hand, explain the exact position of an economy where the theoretical foundation -e.g. a post-Keynesian model -is merely able to describe multiple equilibrium positions. On the other hand, market constellations may also be shaped by institution-building and may, thus, reduce the magnitude of contingency in policy control without propagating the idea of hydraulic policy control, i.e. formability (Gestaltbarkeit) without Cartesian creatability (Machbarkeit).
Of course, there are still many more questions to pose and answer. Can the general impression given in Table 2 be confi rmed once a more detailed empirical investigation follows? If a non-accommodative monetary policy orientation mixed with a coordinated collective bargaining system establishes a market constellation most favourable to general welfare, which institutional setting may guarantee that a cooperative or Fed strategy systematically prevails as opposed to coincidental outcomes depending on personal attitudes (of central bankers)? 55 Are more uncoordinated collective bargaining systems really prone to instability (the UK experience over the past decade seems to suggest a less sceptical outlook). 56 Or are there institutional incentives not yet detected? Can different budgetary policy designs (i.e. "zero-defi cits rules" versus "golden rules") be identifi ed and integrated into the market constellation framework? If market constellations only provide the room for manoeuvre, which institutional incentives can be given to ensure that any room for manoeuvre will be used?
Research into market constellations and macroeconomic policymaking is work in progress. However, eventually it may fi ll the wide gap between nomocratic policy denial on Hayekian premises and teleocratic policy euphoria on (standard) Keynesian premises which has led the theory of economic policy into disarray for the past three decades.
Table 2 Unemployment and Infl ation in Different Market Constellations -Hypothesis and Reality
